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In 1965, English novelist and essayist Brigid Brophy 
published an article in the London Sunday Times that 
would exercise a profound influence on the crusade for 
better treatment of animals in Britain and the United 
States. In this brief article, entitled simply "The Rights 
ofAnimals," Brophy touched upon a number of points 
that were to become central to the arguments in defense 
of animals formulated by subsequent representatives 
of the animal rights movement.! Indeed, Richard D. 
Ryder, one of the most prominent historians of the 
movement, judges Brophy's article to have been 
instrumental in inspiring the rebirth of interest in this 
issue after decades, if not centuries, of neglect and 
indifference. Ryder considers the resurgence of interest 
in the status of animals in the 1960's, as exemplified by 
Brophy's article, to be a corollary to the anti-sexism 
and anti-racism crusades of that period as well as an 
expression of the return-to-nature philosophy of the 
hippie culture of that decade? What impresses one in 
accounts like that of Ryder is the persistent tendency of 
animal rights advocates to regard a serious concern for 
the lot of animals as a distinctly modem phenomenon 
whose philosophical position was formulated only in 
earlier philosophers in defense of animals are either 
ignored or summarily dismissed in most recent 
historical accounts of the growth of human concern for 
nonhuman species. In particular, this prejudice of 
contemporary moral philosophers has caused the 
sometimes profound arguments on the duties of human 
beings toward other species that appear in certain Greek 
writers to be largely overlooked.3 While it would be 
absurdly anachronistic to maintain that a philosophy of 
"animal rights" in a modem sense of that phrase can be 
traced to classical culture, a concern for the welfare of 
animals is clearly in evidence in some ancient writers 
whose arguments in defense of animals at times reveal 
striking foreshadowings of those developed in 
contemporary philosophical inquiries into the moral 
status of animals. This study examines an anticipation, 
in the animal-related treatises of Plutarch, in particular 
in his De sollenia animalium (On the Cleverness of 
Animals), of one of the more controversial arguments 
marshalled today in defense of animals, that which is 
commonly termed the argument from marginal cases.4 
This argument maintains that it is wrong for humans to 
exploit animals in the belief that only humans are 
capable of mtionality or feeling or perhaps the use of 
language. These capabilities are not in fact possessed 
to the same degree by all humans, including, for 
example, such "marginal cases" as infants, the mentally 
feeble, or perhaps the severely physically handicapped. 
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Conversely, science daily furnishes new evidence that 
at least some species of animals have such capabilities 
in a higher degree than do the marginal cases of 
humans.5 If one were to lower the standards of human 
consideration to protect the rights of all sentient humans, 
that is, all humans capable of feeling pain, one would 
still have to protect the rights of many animals who 
certainly possess such sentience, at least to the degree 
that do marginal humans. One does not normally deny 
that marginal humans possess such basic rights as the 
right to life. Consequently, one cannot justly deny to 
animals who possess the capabilities of marginal 
humans those rights that are normally accorded to such 
classes of humans.6 
In three treatises included in his Moralia, Plutarch 
set forth his position on the proper treatment owed by 
humans to animal creation? The longest and most 
carefully argued of these, the dialogue De sollertia 
animalium, explores the question of whether land-
dwelling or sea-dwelling creatures are more clever. No 
conclusion is reached, and one has the impression that 
Plutarch means to suggest that both types are equally 
intelligent. The incomplete treatise De esu carnium (On 
the Eating ofFlesh) presents a case for vegetarianism 
on moral and hygienic grounds. 8 Finally, the brief 
dialogue Bruta animalia ratione uti (That Beasts Are 
Rational), also known as Gryllus ('Porker') from the 
name of one of the interlocutors, envisions a visit by 
Odysseus to one of Circe's pig-converts who declines 
the hero's offer to persuade the witch to reconvert him 
to human form, on the grounds that animals are in all 
respects superior to humans, possessing every virtue 
of humans but none of their lusts and excesses.9 While 
these three treatises differ widely in technique and 
mood, there runs through them a common theme: that 
animals are both sentient and rational, and because of 
that fact, humans have no justification for mistreating 
or exploiting them. 
Plutarch's attempt to prove the rationality of animals 
was motivated by his desire to counter the Stoic position 
that animals cannot reason and therefore do not merit 
human concern. lO It was impossible, according to the 
Stoics, for human beings to act unjustly toward creatures 
that do not understand morality and therefore cannot 
share the values of human beings. In his survey of the 
Stoic ethical system, Cicero specifically mentions the 
alleged lack of rationality in animals that formed the 
cornerstone of the Stoic case against them (De officiis 
[On Duties] 1.50): neque ulla re longius absumus a 
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natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe 
dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, 
bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis 
expertes. ("In no respect are we further removed from 
beasts, in whom we often say that there is courage, as 
in the case of horses or lions; but we do not say that 
there is in them justice, equity or goodness; for they 
are without reason and speeCh").ll Cicero also informs 
us that the Stoic Chrysippus denied the possibility of 
justice between humans and animals (De finibus [On 
Moral Ends] 3. 67): sed quomodo hominum inter 
homines iuris esse vincula putant [Stoici], sic homini 
nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praeclare enim Chrysippus 
cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem 
communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti 
ad utilitatem suampossint sine iniuria. ("B ut in the same 
way as [the Stoics] think that there exist the bonds of 
right between men and men, so do they feel there is no 
bond of right with the beasts. For Chrysippus has well 
observed that other things were born for the sake of 
men and gods, while men and gods exist for their own 
society and fellowship, so that men may use beasts for 
their advantage without injustice"). 
According to Stoic teaching, the irrationality of 
animals was a consequence of the defective nature of 
the animal soul. While it is clear from the extant 
fragments of Chrysippus that the Stoics were willing 
to allow that animals have souls that are in some 
particulars not unlike those of human beings,12 they 
detected a flaw in the animal soul that ultimately 
prevented animals from rising above merely instinctual 
behaviors. The Stoics isolated eight parts of both the 
human and the animal soul, the eighth part of which 
they termed the "governing principle." This sends out 
currents ofbreath, from the heart to the rest of the human 
or animal body that lead to impulses and other sorts of 
behaviors. According to the Stoics, animal behaviors 
consist exclusively of impulses that may be considered 
self-interested, or well-disposed only to the animals 
themselves. Animals consequently make decisions that 
benefit only themselves, such as tlle quest for food or 
the avoidance of pain.13 While human beings have at 
birth a soul not unlike that of the animal, the human 
soul in time demonstrates reason, which allows humans 
to rise above self-interested behaviors and to have 
concern for other rational creatures. Since animals 
cannot rise to the level at which tlley can become aware 
of moral duty toward other rational creatures, humans 
cannot have duties toward them.14 
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Plutarch countered this Stoic assertion of the 
irrationality ofanimals, with its important consequences 
for the Stoic denial of the need for human concern for 
animals, by noting, among other things, that the Stoics 
had in fact made no effort to prove their assertion, with 
which other philosophers would not agree (De sollertia 
animalium 964C): "How is it right for them to assert 
that in their discussion about animals and justice, when 
it is neither generally accepted nor otherwise proven?"15 
To refute the Stoic position, Plutarch cites, throughout 
his three animal-related treatises, examples of animal 
behaviors that seem to argue for rationality in animals. 
His examples are derived in large part from such works 
as Aristotle's Historia animalium (History ofAnimals) 
and De generatione animalium (Generation of 
Animals), the now-lost zoological treatises of 
Tbeophrastus, and the dialogues of Plato, and source-
hunting critics have often observed that his examples 
are mere commonplaces drawn from the stockpile of 
the sometime naive reflections of Greek natural 
philosophy that do not suggest personal study on 
Plutarch's part.16 For example, both his observation that 
the mongoose covers its body in mud to protect itself 
from the bite of its enemy the crocodile (De sollertia 
animalium 966D), and his anecdote that an aged and 
"retired" mule was once known to have encouraged 
younger mules in their labors (De sollertia animalium 
970B), are derived from Aristotle's Historia animalium 
(612A and 477B). Yet the mere identification of 
Plutarch's sources overlooks the fact that a significant 
number of Plutarch's examples are chosen to develop 
his thesis that in some aspects of intelligence, demeanor 
and character, animals equal or outstrip human beings, 
a proposition that is, at least in part, implicit in the 
argument from marginal cases. This idea is set forth at 
length in a light-hearted fashion by the pig-philosopher 
Gryllus in the dialogue of that name. The thoughtful 
pig observes, for example, that animals are more just 
than are human beings, for they never seek to enslave 
other animals (987B), and he argues that animals exceed 
humans in courage, since while male and female 
animals fight equally fiercely, female humans seek to 
avoid battle (987F-988A). Moreover, animal intel-
ligence (991D) in some respects exceeds that ofhumans 
because animals have from birth all skills needed for a 
successful life, while humans must cultivate their 
intelligence to guide them in a useful direction. Finally, 
animals more frequently display temperance than do 
humans, for animals are far less likely to overeat than 
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humans, and do not seek luxurious housing or other 
possessions as do humans (989B-F). Gryllus ends his 
catalogue of animal excellences by stating his 
amazement that he had ever allowed himself to be 
convinced when human that only humans possess 
reason and sensation (992C): "Having entered into this 
body, I am amazed at the arguments by which I was 
convinced by the sophists to think tllat all creatures 
excepting man are without reason and sense." By 
"sophists," Gryllus probably means the Stoics, against 
whom the entire dialogue is directed. Plutarch uses a 
similarargument from animal perception and intelligence 
to oppose the eating ofmeat in the treatise De esu carnium 
(997E), where he praises Pythagoras and Empedocles 
for enjoining humans to avoid eating animals.17 . 
The treatise De sollertia animalium presents 
Plutarch's most elaborate defense of the proposition 
that animals can reason and have sentience. Before 
the interlocutors Aristotimus and Phaedimus offer a 
lengthy catalogue of examples of animal rationality 
(966B-985D), their friends Soclarus and Autobulus 
set forth some theoretical considerations on animal 
rationality (960B-961F) that lead to Plutarch's 
anticipation of the argument from marginal cases 
(962A-D). Autobulus observes that that which is 
irrational is soulless while that which has a soul is 
sentient, and even the Stoics do not deny that animals 
have souls (96OC-D). He mentions approvingly a work 
by the Peripatetic Strato in which that philosopher had 
demonstrated that it is impossible for any creature to 
have sensation without some degree of intellectual 
activity (961 A), and he delights in catching up the 
Stoics in a self-contradiction. I 8 Why, he asks (961D), 
do they bother to punish their dogs and horses if not 
because they expect them to alter their behavior, which 
is only possible if the creatures can reflect on the 
purpose of their chastisement? They seek thereby to 
create in their animals a feeling of repentance, which, 
as the Greek word implies, entails reflection. 
While he is tempted to accept Autobulus' arguments 
on animal rationality, Soclarus states that he still 
considers it the principal failing of animals, among their 
many other shortcomings, that they do not purposefully 
aim toward virtue, which is the proper activity ofrea'>on. 
He confesses himself at a loss as to why nature would 
have given the beginnings of reason to creatures that 
cannot demonstrate the absolute fullness of reason 
(962A): "On examining their many other failings, I note 
that of virtue, toward which reason itself exists; nor do 
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I observe clear progress toward it, nor inclination. I am 
at a loss as to how nature gave them the beginning of it, 
when they could not arrive at its perfection." 
In his reply to Soclarus, Autobulus posits a situation 
in which the claims of animals to fair consideration by 
humans are defended by analogy with the claims of a 
''marginal'' class ofhumans, namely slaves. He observes 
that those who see no difference between the virtue of 
a Socrates or a Plato and that of a slave would likewise 
fail to see that the virtue of an animal is imperfect rather 
than nonexistent (962B):"But look at this too: is it not 
ridiculous to keep saying that persons like Socrates and 
Plato take part in vice no less evil than does any slave, 
and that they are just as foolish and intemperate and 
unjust, and at the same time to criticize the impure and 
imperfect virtue of animals as absence of virtue and 
not as its weakness and lack of perfection?" In 
Autobulus' view, one may speak of degrees of virtue, 
and these degrees are directly proportional to the 
reasoning capacities of the individuals in question. 
Certain classes of living things are not by nature 
designed to receive perfect reason nor, in consequence, 
to exhibit perfect virtue, but it is not correct, in his view, 
to conclude that those creatures who do not possess 
perfect reason do not possess reason at all, for every 
living creature possesses reason (962C): "There is a 
portion of reason in aliliving creatures." While animals, 
like slaves, fall into the class of those who are not born 
to receive perfect reason, yet both have some reason 
and therefore some virtue. What distinguishes a slave 
from a Socrates, or an animal from a human being, is 
the degree to which that innate reason is cultivated 
through training and education (962C): "For reason is 
inborn from nature, but genuine and complete reason 
arises from practice and education." Such training and 
education lie outside the experience of a slave or of an 
animal, and the virtue ofeach must remain rudimentary. 
Yet a slave, even if he can never be a Socrates, has 
some claim on human sympathy since he shares to some 
degree the virtue of a Socrates because he can reason 
to some degree. Not every rational creature, after all, 
has the perfection of every virtue (962D): "Hence not 
every creature endowed with reason has to the same 
degree the perfection of mental acuity and sharpness." 
Likewise an animal shares in the reason that a slave 
possesses, since all living things are born with some 
reason, as Plutarch has been at pains to show throughout 
his animal-related treatises and has allowed even the 
somewhat skeptical Soclarus to acknowledge at the 
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beginning of the passage under discussion here (962A). 
Ifan animal possesses some reason, then it would seem 
to be entitled to the same consideration that must be 
accorded to the slave. 
While Plutarch stops short here of specifying what 
constitutes the consideration that ought to be shown to 
a slave, and, in consequence, to animals, since they 
have a share of rationality in Plutarch's view, he 
enunciates the belief in a famous passage of his 
biography of the Roman statesman Cato the Elder, that 
at least kindness is owed to slaves. Moreover, he 
specifically links the necessity of showing kindness to 
slaves to a necessity of showing it to animals as well. 
When censuring Cato for selling offhis old slaves when 
they were too old to be profitable, he remarks (Cato 
Maior 339) that he considers it the mark ofa very harsh 
character to see no other tie between man and man than 
that of usefulness. Beneficence and kindness flow from 
a gentle heart, even to animals, and a good man will 
take care of his animals as of his worn-out slaves. 
Plutarch argues here as he had in his animal-related 
treatises: if one may defend those classes of human 
beings who cannot attain to the virtue of a Socrates, 
then one must defend animals who are not born to attain 
to perfect virtue any more than are those "marginal 
classes" of human beings like slaves. 
The premises upon which the argument from 
marginal cases rests all find expression in Plutarch's 
discussion of humankind's relationship to animals: the 
idea that animals can to some extent reason and feel; 
the idea that such intellectual capacities in animals may 
equal or exceed those capacities in some classes of 
humans; and the idea that even defective classes of 
humans are entitled to some consideration, are clearly 
voiced in Plutarch's animal-related treatises. He comes 
closest to integrating these premises into a formulation 
of the argument from marginal cases in De sollertia 
animalium. In the final analysis, it must be admitted 
that his statement of the argument is not so succinct as 
that of Porphyry,19 nor does he specify in detail to what 
rights either the marginal cases of humans or animals 
might in fact be entitIed.20 Yet Plutarch at least deserves 
credit for introducing into Greek speculation about the 
nature of humankind's relationship to otIler sentient 
beings a form ofargument that continues to be employed 
by thinkers who seek to better the lot of animals, and 
for developing that argument with tile logical rigor and 
compassion that distinguish the best literature of the 
modem movement for animal rights. 
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sympathy for animal creation. 
17 The motives that led Empedocles and Pythagoras to 
argue against the consumption of animal-derived foods are 
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far from agreed upon by scholars. Empedocles seems to have 
believed that men during the Golden Age naturally spared 
animals because human natures were then more gentle and 
amiable; see, for example, Empedocles: The Extant 
Fragments, ed. M. R. Wright (New Haven 1981), fragment 
119 (Diels-Kranz 130), with Wright's commentary, 284; 
more recently, Brad Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles 
(Toronto 1992) 60-61, interprets Empedocles' Golden Age 
theory and its implications for human behavior toward 
animals. In the case of Pythagoras, Tsekourakis 370-379 has 
shown that various beliefs contributed to Pythagoras' 
opposition to meat-eating, including his belief in metemp-
sychosis and his notion that consumption of meat befouled 
the soul. Concern for animals as suffering creatures seems 
to have played little part in Pythagoras' doctrine, which sets 
him apart from Plutarch. 
18 Plutarch's treatise De Stoicorum repugnantiis (On Stoic 
Self-Contradictions) is a lengthy catalogue of contradictions 
detectable in Stoic doctrine, most especially in the works of 
Chrysippus, whom Plutarch charges (1047B) with saying 
anything that occurs to him. 
19 See note 4 above. 
20 It might be noted that even Tom Regan, "An Examina-
tion and Defense ofOne Argument Concerning Animal Rights," 
passim, while offering an exhaustive defense of the proposition 
that animals are entitled to any rights to which marginal cases 
of humans are entitled, hesitates to specify what those rights 
might be. In The CaseforAnimal Rights (Berkeley 1983) 276-
280, Regan argues that all moral agents and patients possess at 
least the right to respectful treatment, a point ofview remarkably 
similar to that advanced in Plutarch's discussion of Cato's 
unfeeling treatment of his slaves and animals. Regan argues 
that according respectful treatment to marginal cases ofhumans 
will prevent persons from treating them as if they were receptacles 
ofvalue without value of their own, for such a view would allow 
one to harm them by causing them suffering. Such behavior is, 
in the view of both Plutarch and Regan, morally wrong. 
Caterpillar 
lam born 
And then, all at once, 
The pale light of spring, 
That has hung for my whole life 
In the air like winter's breath, 
Changes into gold. 
And the warm hand of the sun, 
Through the new leaves, 
Falls trembling over me. 
And beneath me, beneath the rough bark 
I have known forever, the sleeping sap rises 
Through the very skeleton of this tree. 
It is then that I feel at my shoulders 
An ache 
That will pull me into air. 
And so, even as the last clinging web, 
Where I was born with a thousand others 
To crawl across a tree, 
Floats shining to the ground, 
I twirl my silk around and around 
Just me 
Then sleep, then wake again, born and new. 
Now in the hot sun, my wings 
Like petals dry blue and butter 
And suddenly, the whole world fills for me 
With flowers, 
The way the world must fill for you 
With those stars you love, that sometimes, 
On the darkest nights, step down. 
And catch the wish you throw them. 
Kathryn Winograd 
Littleton, Colorado 
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